Tag Archive for free-will at Zeal For Truth

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Vico And Calvin, Part 2

Published by Bryan March 4, 2008 in General and Philosophy. 2 Comments

This is part two in a two part series examining the similarities and differences in Vico and Calvin’s understanding of providence. Part one here.

Vico’s Providence
The differences in what providence is able to accomplish has consequences for one’s understanding of free will. Vico’s understanding of providence and free will is often difficult to make sense of. At some points he seems to suggest that providence cannot overcome a person’s will, yet at others it appears as if providence can. This can be seen when comparing sections 310 and 341.

In 310 Vico states:

And therefore it demonstrates the Catholic principles of grace: this it operates in man when his condition is one not of negation but of privation of good works, and hence of a potentially for them which is ineffectual; that is gives effect to this potentiality and this it therefore cannot act without the principle of free choice, which God aids naturally by His providence.

Yet in 341, Vico says:

Therefore it is only by divine providence that he can be held within these institutions to practice justice as a member of the society of the family, of the city, and finally of mankind.

In the first section Vico appears to be saying that mankind has the ability to do good works, and that ability is aided by providence, yet in the second section it is only by divine providence that mankind can be just which might negate free will. Since Calvin also has to deal with the issue of providence and free will, and he does so in a more direct way. It will serve us to examine his view at this point and then, returning to Vico’s to compare, attempt to make sense of the possible inconsistency.

Calvin’s Providence
Calvin’s understanding of providence does away with anything that can rightly be called a free will (Calvin does hold on to the term but removes choice from it as seen in Institutes II. II. VII.). He is clear when he says:

That men do nothing save at the secret instigation of God, and do not discuss and deliberate on anything but what he has previously decreed with himself, and brings to pass by his secret direction, is proved by numberless clear passages of scripture. (Calvin I. XVIII. I.)

There is no action that God does not govern by His providence, no chance, and no possibilities, everything is directly determined by God through His providence. Combined with the understanding that God is an all determining being is Calvin’s own unique take on biblical anthropology. Not only does he hold to the understanding that in the biblical fall mankind became corrupted, but also lost the ability to do any good work on his own which we shall see is more radical a position then Vico. Again Calvin is unambiguous;

All this being admitted, it will be beyond dispute, that free will does not enable any man to perform good works, unless he is assisted by grace… (Calvin II. II. VI).

Although it would be easy to assume that Vico’s providence removes free will and makes God into some kind of being similar to Calvin’s God, the role for providence and the free will he imagines mankind as having must be less deterministic then what Calvin proposes. The fact that Vico speaks of providence aiding and not determining mankind shows that there is a vast difference in the way these two men understand God working among mankind, but how exactly does Vico’s understanding of providence and free will differ from Calvin?

The differences between the two thinkers starts with their understanding of the state of mankind. Although both agree that mankind has undergone some kind of corruption, the extent of that corruption is different. For Calvin, this corruption is total. There is nothing good left in mankind, all ability mankind may have had to do good before the fall is gone, and all that remains now is our capacity and drive to commit evil (Calvin II. II. XXVII.). Although Vico agrees with Calvin that mankind is corrupted, he would see Calvin as taking that corruption too far. When in section 310, Vico gives his most complete account of the fall of mankind he says; “…that man is not unjust by nature in the absolute sense, but by nature fallen and weak.” Vico seems then to hold a position that recognizes mankind being in a corrupt state, but a corrupt state that has only weakened their will to do good, not fully destroying it. This weakened will then allows Vico to hold on to the notion of a free will. The will may be partial to doing what is wrong, but it can be directed to do good. However, how can this be squared with Vico’s statement in section 341?
Continue reading ‘Vico And Calvin, Part 2′

Valuation

Published by cchrisr October 31, 2007 in Philosophy. 5 Comments

The problem with values is that they are dependent upon specific beliefs. For instance, the concept of valuating concepts depends upon the belief that concepts can be evaluated and “judged” according to some set of principles. There is also the dependency of those particular principles. Theoretically, if the required beliefs are removed, the values based on them should fall, much like the removal of a foundation.

This is one of the premises behind Nietzsche’s sustained attack on Christianity. According to John Wilcox’s seminal work on metaethical analysis of Nietzsche, Truth and Value in Nietzsche, this attack centers around five beliefs: the existence of God, the existence of another world, free will, a moral order to the world, and a purely moral motivation. While each of these would be worth exploration, for now we will focus on one in two parts: freedom and the will.

Freedom
Nietzsche is dead-set against any kind of real “freedom” in actions. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche writes that the new doctrine of the “immoralists” is that “no one gives man his qualities–neither God, nor society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself” (VI, 8). The last part is important here: one does not even give oneself one’s qualities. In other words, one is unable to determine who/what/how one is. In Human, All-Too-Human, Nietzsche iterates the same concept of Laplace: “In looking at a waterfall we imagine that there is freedom of will and fancy in the countless turnings, twistings, and breakings of the waves; but everything is compulsory, every movement can be mathematically calculated. So it is also with human actions…” (106). There is no freedom in Nietzsche primarily because the will is not a faculty of one’s actions. In other words, one does not will. Instead, one’s will compels one to action; there is no real choice because it had been decided before a choice was even possible.

Der Wille
Nietzsche conceives of the will differently than most Westerners have in the past two hundred years. As I mentioned just above, the will is not an agent of action for Nietzsche. The ability to choose one’s fancy (e.g. caesar vs ranch dressing) is not really a matter of the will.

This misunderstanding began back before Plato and Socrates as thinkers began to associate the will as the cause of an action. This transformed into the idea that the consciousness was the actual cause. Finally, in Descartes, we have the ultimate error: the ego (the self) as the cause of an action. Nietzsche writes in Twilight, “Men were considered ‘free’ so that they might be judged and punished–so that they might become guilty: consequently, every act had to be considered as willed, and the origin of every act had to be considered as lying within the consciousness (and thus the most fundamental counterfeit in psychologicis was made the principle of psychology itself).” In other words, for the values of “good and evil” in the bad conscience of Christianity to work, it required man to be responsible for his actions, which further required the will as an agent of the self.

Values
In order to understand what Nietzsche means by his title Beyond Good and Evil as well as his designation as an “immoralist,” one must understand how Nietzsche conceives of the will and freedom. Nietzsche is not advocating a view “beyond morals” at all, but rather a view in which guilt is redeemed as a result of the will. Nietzsche’s concept of redemption can be seen in both Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Antichrist: “To redeem what is past in man and to re-create all ‘it was’ until the will says, ‘Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it!’” Redemption in this perspective of Nietzsche I am presenting (there are other ones that may all be contradictory) is the value of affirmation. The final stage of man is not the lion who roars “No!” to laws but rather the child who innocently speaks “Yes!” to new values. This is why Nietzsche respects the Jewish priests and Paul even though they become the epitome of ressentiment: they created values.

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