Tag Archive for difference at Zeal For Truth

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Faith Problems, 4

Published by cchrisr December 13, 2007 in Philosophy. 0 Comments

After looking at Kierkegaard’s concept of faith and Nietzsche’s introduction to semiotics, we now turn to the primary philosopher of difference, Gilles Deleuze. He’s a bit unknown, even in philosophy circles. In Deleuzian terms, Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith embodies difference. He is unrepeatable, paradoxical, and contradictory. He is a multiplicity. Here, I want to outline what difference is and why this is an integral part of Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith. Our primary text is Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.

Determining Difference
Deleuze writes that “difference is the state in which one can speak of determinations as such” (D&R, 28). It is this as such that is important for Deleuze. Difference is not a constant process but an immediate event. His example is lightning distinguishing itself from the undifferentiated, from the void of indifference. Difference occurs between the undifferentiated like a “struggle against an elusive adversary, in which the distinguished opposes something which cannot distinguish itself from it but continues to espouse that which divorces it” (D&R, 28).

It is common to perceive difference in terms of the opposition of extremes or contraries (e.g., black vs. white), but this only scrapes the surface of difference. When these two extremes are taken to infinity, it becomes clear that they are simply opposite forces of the same quality. In other words, they are repetitions of the indifferent. To think of difference, one must deny the indifferent in order to make the different. Difference must be pushed to its limit, “the ground which is no less its return or its reproduction than its annihilation” (D&R, 45).

Being Different
It was Duns Scotus who has made the only ontological proposition: “Being is univocal” (D&R, 35). This has always been the only ontology and it is what is echoed in all ontology before and after, from Parmenides to Heidegger. At the limits of infinity, we can see that difference does not presuppose some sort of identity, as Hegel had concluded, but rather that identity, through the opposition of identities, presupposes difference and even distorts it. It is not enough to say that “difference in itself is not ‘already’ contradiction” but also that difference cannot be reduced to contradiction (D&R 51). Difference is the mirror which inverts the surface of identity, Lewis Carroll’s looking glass.

It was Nietzsche who first saw this concept and it is his philosophy of contradictions that really sought out difference. Reading Nietzsche’s concepts such as “beyond good and evil” as a simple rejection of morality is faulty because it still follows the conflict which Nietzsche rejects: “Thus Nietzsche reproaches all those selection procedures based upon opposition or conflict with working to the advantage of the average forms and operation to the benefit of the ‘large number’” (D&R, 54). Through Nietzsche’s eternal return, univocal Being is dissolved and “the superior form of everything that is” is uncovered. Eternal return itself “makes the difference” and displays the “univocity of the different” (D&R, 55).

Learning Difference
The activity of learning may be the most profound insight into difference. Being corresponds to the problem or question as though “there was an ‘opening’, a ‘gap’, an ontological ‘fold’ which relates being and the question to one another” (D&R, 64). Being, here, is difference as well as non being. This non-being should be understood as the negation of being but rather the “being of problem and question” (D&R, 64). Non-being is also difference. In this sense, non-being “should rather be written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being” (D&R, 64). By confusing this (non)-being with negation, contradiction is brought into being and the sight of difference is lost to it.

Tragedy and Faith

Published by cchrisr August 23, 2007 in Religion. 12 Comments

This is intended as a recap of the first three posts in “Faith Problems.” Why a recap in the middle of series? Well, primarily this is because the first three posts were discussions on Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling. From here, the series is going to leap from that groundwork into what I would consider much more complex. Understanding the groundwork I have presented will be important in understanding the application of the philosophy of difference (the more complex future) to Kierkegaard’s concept of faith.

What faith is not
Kierkegaard’s opus has revolved around three different characters: the aesthetic, the tragic, and the knight of faith. These are characters in the sense of how a role is to be played, as if Kierkegaard is a stage director and everyone is an actor. This is similar to Nietzsche’s project in The Birth of Tragedy in that Nietzsche is telling Richard Wagner how roles should be played more so than how people are. For Kierkegaard, the role of the Knight of Faith is the most elusive to capture; very few people can perform in that role. The best example of this character is the story of Abraham going to sacrifice his son. Before we analyze what faith is, we should look at what it is not. For all cases below, the character is placed in a position between the universal ethical and the particular.

The Tragic Hero
The tragic hero is the most referred to figure in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling as a contrast for the Knight of Faith. The tragic hero can be seen in the figures of Brutus. The point with this character is that he never violates the rule of the ethical. The universal ethical law always wins in this case. Brutus must rebel against Julius Caesar because it is his duty towards the universal ethical. Even though he is close friends to Julius, maintaining the universal is more important than that friendship. Everything is subsumed under the concept of the universal. The status quo overpowers the different.

This is the same concept Kant has in mind when he formulates the Categorical Imperative (act as if each action were a universal law for all). What makes the tragic hero tragic is that he must make a sacrifice in order to maintain the universal ethic; Brutus must betray and kill his close friend to the point where it is even against his own desire.

The Aesthetic Hero
This character is more like a comical mishap. The aesthetic hero is put into his situation by chance or accident. It is the old fool mistaken as the secret agent. The aesthetic hero is able to question others about his position. The best example of this is Agamemnon, who swears to the gods that if his ship can safely make it back to Greece from Troy, he will sacrifice the first person he sees. When his ship arrives back in Greece safely, the first person to meet him is his daughter. He is caught between the universal ethical (sacrifice his daughter to fulfill his oath) and the particular (transgress his oath and let his daughter live). He is able to speak to others (his wife, his captains, the priests) before he finds that he must sacrifice his daughter in order to maintain the universal. The law must be upheld and there is nobody above it.

Kirk’s Illogical Premise
It is at the end of Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (if you haven’t seen it yet and don’t want the spoilers…too bad) where we can start to see the character of the Knight of Faith.

In the last dialogue between Kirk and Spock, Spock questions Kirk why Kirk came back to rescue Spock. For Spock, the logical (and universal ethical) thing to do was to let him die as a sacrifice because Spock willingly sacrificed himself in order to save everyone else. Kirk’s response to Spock’s question is where we discover the abandoning of the universal for something more important: “Because the needs of the one…outweigh the needs of the many.” There was something that Kirk found to be more important than the universal, more than the status quo. Sarek (Spock’s father) tells Kirk, at one point in the movie, the illogical nature of his actions: “This cost you your ship, your son…”. Kirk’s immediate response, though, is that of a higher calling: “If I hadn’t tried, it would’ve cost me my soul.”

For the Knight of Faith, his actions against the universal may be harmful to his livelihood, even his life, but to not do it would cost something even greater than those. The Knight of Faith is apprehended by this call from the unknown; the directive comes from an Absolute that is greater than the universal. This Absolute is infinitely particular and specific. The person possessed by this “higher calling” is absolutely differentiated from all others. He is unable to speak about his calling because it is unintelligible to the universal. It is illogical, incoherent, and crazy.

We see this in Abraham. He had at least three people he could have discussed God’s message with, but he did not. In fact, he could not because he could not have made his case understandable. All three people would have said that he misheard God, that he was crazy, and that he should not sacrifice his son (under any circumstances). Abraham could not “test the spirit” against any known authority because all authorities would have said it was impossible that God commanded Abraham to do something that is against God’s own laws.

The Paradox of Faith
Abraham’s story is a clear example of the paradox: “either Abraham was every minute a murderer, or we are confronted by a paradox that is higher than all mediation” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 56). In other words, either there is or there isn’t something greater than the universal ethical. If there isn’t, then Abraham was a murderer, plain and simple. If there is, then it is something irrational, illogical, and yet supersedes the universal. For Kierkegaard, this is faith, the duty towards the absolute (God).

The Knight of Faith, then, must stand absolutely different from mankind. He cannot resolve the paradox of faith with the universal ethical. Abraham remained in the paradoxical position: he must sacrifice his son while still loving him. For Abraham to no longer love his son would would make him a murderous person. For Abraham to reject his duty to God would make him unfaithful.

Brutus, our tragic hero, was in this position briefly, but he chose to sacrifice his friendship in order to maintain his duty to the universal. Abraham is torn between being unfaithful to God and unfaithful to his family. Were he to falter on either side would have meant everything to him, his very soul. It is through the absurdity of both accepting and rejecting the universal and duty towards the absolute that the Knight of Faith walks. This is why he is absolutely different from mankind.

Faith Problems, 3

Published by cchrisr August 7, 2007 in Religion. 12 Comments

Previously, I have outlined Kierkegaard’s idea of the suspension of universal ethics for duty towards God. This was then contrasted with the tragic hero who remains in the universal ethic. The Knight of Faith is wholly unique from other humans because of the paradox of faith. The Knight of Faith is absolutely different from mankind. Now, we take a more in-depth look at the character and actions of the Knight of Faith (KoF). For the KoF, submitting to the universal ethic is glorious because it is understandable. It also brings security. Yet the KoF foregos that for duty towards God, something not understandable and against the universal ethic. Duty towards God makes the universal ethic mere temptations for the KoF. For Abraham “could surely have wished now and then that the task were to love Isaac as becomes a father, in a way intelligible to all, memorable throughout all ages; he could wish that the task were to sacrifice Isaac for the universal, that he might incite the fathers to illustrious deeds — and he is almost terrified by the thought that for him such wishes are only temptations and must be dealt with as such, for he knows that it is a solitary path he treads and that he accomplishes nothing for the universal but only himself is tried and examined” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 66). None of Abraham’s actions here was for the universal ethic. Abraham’s action does not save the state, his family, or the universal ethic. Would he not be considered mad? After 130 years, Abraham finally gets a son and then goes to sacrifice the boy! Abraham doesn’t explain why he must do these things, only that it is a trial. His actions never become available for public scrutiny.
The KoF is absolutely different from others: “So the knight of faith has first and foremost the requisite passion to concentrate upon a single factor the whole of the ethical which he transgresses, so that he can give himself the assurance that he really loves Isaac with his whole soul. If he cannot do that, he is in temptation” (Kierkegaard, F&T, 68). Furthermore, the KoF has “enough passion to make this assurance available in the twinkling of an eye and in such a way that is completely valid as it was in the first instance” (Kierkegaard, F&T, 68). He is also alone and without support of the universal ethic. Lastly, the KoF is silent to the ethical. Having accepted the paradox, Abraham does not speak to Sarah, Eleazar, or to Isaac–three ethical authorities; this is because “the ethical had for Abraham no higher expression than the family life” (Kierkegaard, F&T, 100). The KoF already understood the universal ethic and knew that his actions would transgress such ethics. Abraham cannot be an aesthetic hero because the aesthetic hero is such by an accident; there is no accident in God’s directive to Abraham. Abraham cannot be a tragic hero either because a tragic hero sacrifices all of himself in order to reveal his pledge to the universal ethic; Abraham, on the other hand, does nothing for the universal and remains concealed to it. Abraham can only be a KoF, in paradox: “Either the individual as the individual is able to stand in an absolute relation to the absolute (and then the ethical is not the highest) /or Abraham is lost–he is neither a tragic hero, nor an aesthetic hero” (Kierkegaard, F&T, 100). Unlike the aesthetic hero who can speak, Abraham cannot. Abraham cannot make his position any more understandable if he were to speak for days on end uninterrupted. He is unable to find relief in the universal. And this is where the second movement brings Abraham into faith. The first movement was that of infinite resignation–that of giving up the universal ethic (see part 1). The second movement is that of the absurd. Abraham finds comfort in the absurd by saying “But yet this will not come to pass, or, if it does come to pass, then the Lord will give me a new Isaac” (Kierkegaard, F&T, 102). The Knight of Faith, when seen from the perspective of the universal ethic, is a fool. He transgresses the ethical for some duty to something higher than the universal, is unintelligible, and finds comfort in the very thing leading him to break the universal ethic.

Faith Problems, 2

Published by cchrisr July 10, 2007 in Religion. 0 Comments

In the last post (link), I introduced what Kierkegaard calls a “teleological suspension of the ethical.” This is something strictly from the point of view of mankind because ethics is for man. The primary thrust of this suspension was the notion of an absolute duty toward God in that this absolute duty has the authority to suspend ordinary ethics. This suspension, if it is possible, would have the superficial look of a tragedy but would more closely resemble a passion. A tragedy remains planted in the ethical; this duty supersedes it. Kierkegaard contends that the ethical comes from one’s relation to the absolute (i.e. God) and not vice versa. If this is the case, then there is such a thing as an absolute duty towards God that overrides the ethical. This is the paradox of faith. Kierkegaard also suggests that “[i]f such is not the case, then faith has no proper place in existence, then faith is a temptation, and Abraham is lost, since he gave into it” (Fear and Tembling, 60).
For Kierkegaard, faith must be something wholly other from the universal/ethical. Faith is the unintelligible paradox, infinitely personal and subjective. Confusing it with the immediate (as early phenomenology was doing at the time) is a travesty. One knight of faith cannot help another. Here we can see Kierkegaard taking a radical rejection of Aristotle’s Virtue-Happiness link, something that Kant began to reject in his categorical imperative. Because of this radical difference in faith, one’s duty is done out of duty towards the absolute, not because the duty is ethical or because the result may be happiness. Duty is done regardless of its consequences or ethical nature. Unlike the tragic hero who renounces himself for the universal, the knight of faith “renounces the universal in order to become the individual” (F&T, 65). The knight of faith embraces difference absolutely. The true knight of faith cannot be repeated in ceremony, ritual, or practice. The true knight of faith stands alone and absolutely different from mankind.

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